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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2A-3(2)(k), as amended. Jurisdiction in the
Supreme Court prior to transfer was proper under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(3)(j), as amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment
by ruling that as a matter of law the racing application form
signed by the St. George Lions Club did not provide a ground for
the American Quarter Horse Association's indemnity claim against
the International Association of Lions Clubs for injury to jockey
Peter Chavez.
Summary

judgment

should

be

granted

if

the pleadings,

depositions, affidavits, and admissions show that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P.; Webster v.
Sill. 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983). The district court's conclusion
of law is reviewed for correctness by this Court, State v. Rio
Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1990).
The appellate court may affirm a grant of summary judgment
on any ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not
relied on by the trial court. Higgins v. Salt Lake Co., 855 P.2d
231, 235 (Utah 1993) .

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES.
RULES AND REGULATIONS
There are none whose interpretation is determinative of the
issues raised in this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
Plaintiffs are the parents of Gilbert Chavez, a horse jockey
who was seriously injured in a horse racing accident at the Dixie
Downs track meet at St. George, Utah, on April 21, 1989.
Plaintiffs' first amended

complaint

asserts

negligence

claims against (1) American Quarter Horse Association ("AQHA"),
which

allegedly

sanctioned

and

controlled

the

race;

(2)

Washington County, which allegedly owned and maintained the
racetrack; and (3) St. George Association of Lions Clubs, which
allegedly installed and maintained the racetrack and equipment.
Each defendant has denied negligence and liability and has raised
affirmative

defenses.

These claims

remain pending

in the

district court, and are set for jury trial beginning January 30,
1995.
AQHA also filed a third party complaint seeking contractual
indemnity for AQHA's own negligence against an additional party
not named as a defendant in plaintiffs' first amended complaint,
the International Association of Lions Clubs ("the International
Association").

This indemnity claim was based on a written

"Application for Recognition of Grading Races" dated July 13,
1988, over nine months before the accident, and signed by:
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"St. George Lions Club Joe Bowcutt - track manager."

The

application states that the St. George Lions Club agrees to
indemnify AQHA from any liability arising from unsafe track
conditions.

However, the International Association is not a

party and does not appear anywhere on the written application.
However, AQHA alleged that the St. George Club was a subsidiary
of the International Association, and therefore the International
Association should be liable to AQHA.
Following discovery, the International Association moved for
summary

judgment in its favor dismissing this third party

complaint.

The International Association pointed out to the

trial court that AQHA's third party complaint did not assert that
the International Association committed a tort or did anything
wrong. AQHA simply asserted that the St. George Lions Club was a
subsidiary

of

the

International

Association

and

thus

the

International Association should be vicariously or derivatively
liable for any contractual duty the St. George Lions Club had
under the written application to indemnify AQHA for AQHArs
negligence.
The discovery record established that the International
Association is completely separate from the St. George Lions
Club, and nobody from the International Association had any role
in the Chavez accident.

Further, nobody from the International

Association had anything to do with the written application
signed by the St. George Club.

Finally, the wording of the

application was insufficient to establish contractual indemnity.
3

On this basis, Judge Eves granted summary judgment to the International Association dismissing it from AQHA's third party
complaint.
Since the summary judgment in favor of the International
Association disposed of all claims against it, the trial court
entered final judgment under Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P.
quently filed this appeal.

AQHA subse-

On January 4, 1994, the Court of

Appeals ruled that the case was properly certified under Rule
54(b) and that this appeal is properly before the Court of
Appeals as an appeal from a final judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The International Association requests this Court to affirm
summary judgment in its favor, dismissing the indemnity claim in
AQHA's third-party complaint.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

This action arises from an accident which occurred on

April 21, 1989, when Peter Chavez was injured while riding in a
horse race conducted at the Dixie Downs Race Meet in St. George,
Utah.

(Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, R. 352-357).
2.

Plaintiffs' first amended complaint is directed against

defendants AQHA; Washington County, Utah; and the St. George
Association of Lions Clubs. Plaintiffs' original complaint made
claims against the International Association.
claims

were

dismissed

by plaintiffs

and

the

However, those
International

Association does not appear as a defendant in plaintiffs' first
amended complaint.

(R. 259-261; 353-357).
4

3.

In its answer to plaintiffs' first amended complaint,

AQHA filed a third-party complaint against the
Association.

International

The third-party complaint does not assert that the

International Association itself was guilty of any wrongdoing,
but simply asserts that the St. George Lions Club is a subsidiary
of the

International Association

Association

is

vicariously

or

and thus the

derivatively

International

liable

for

any

contractual duty on the part of the St. George Lions Club to
indemnify AQHA under the written Application for Recognition of
Grading Races made by the St. George Lions Club on July 13, 1988.
The one-page application provides in part:
Applicant does hereby agree to indemnity,
save and hold harmless the American Quarter
Horse Association from any liability arising
from unsafe conditions of track facilities
or grandstand, default in payment of stakes
or purses, or publication or dissemination
by Association of information concerning any
disciplinary
rulings
of
Applicant's
stewards.
(AQHA's Third-Party Complaint, R. 493-505.

The Application of

Recognition of Grading Races is attached to this brief as Exhibit
A. ) .
4.

Discovery depositions were taken by Mark C. Lukas,

Executive Administrator of the International Association at his
offices in Illinois; Ron McArthur, Secretary-Treasurer of the
St. George Lions Club; and Joseph H. Bowcutt, Track Manager for
the St. George Lions Club. The discovery record established that
the International Association at no time agreed to be bound to
the terms of the Application for Recognition of Grading Races.
5

The International Association did not receive, review, or have
any

information

about

this

contract.

The

International

Association has never had any communications with the St. George
Lions Club or the AQHA wherein it agreed to be bound by the
indemnification

provisions

of

the

contract.

Nor

did

the

International Association ever give the St. George Lions Club
authority

to represent

it and bind

it to the terms of the

contract.

At no time subseguent to the contract's execution did

the International Association ratify the terms of the contract or
agree to be in any way bound to it.

(Mark Lukas Depo. at pp. 37-

40, R. 1340 et seg.; Ronald McArthur Depo. at pp. 72, R. 1526 et
seg.; Joseph Bowcutt Depo. at p. 77, R. 1245 et seg.).
5.

The International Association has never asked the St.

George Lions Club to act on the

International

behalf or represent it in any matter.

Association's

(Mark Lukas Depo. at p.

27, R. 1340 et seg.).
6.

The

International

Association

organization based in Oakbrook, Illinois.

is

a

nonprofit

(Mark Lukas Depo. at

p. 8, R. 1340 et seg.).
7.

Mark

C.

Lukas,

executive

administrator

of

the

International Association, is familiar with its business affairs,
and how the International Association relates with local Lions
Clubs throughout the United States and elsewhere.
Depo. at pp. 6-7, R. 1340 et seg.).

(Mark Lukas

Ronald McArthur is the

secretary/treasurer of the St. George Lions Club and has served
as the club's liaison to the International Association for the
6

past 34 years.
seq.).

(Ronald McArthur Depo., pp. 49, 50, R. 152 6 et

Joseph Bowcutt is a former president of the St. George

Lions Club, was the club's track manager at Dixie Downs in 1988
and

1989,

and

was

the

club

member

that

signed

Application for Recognition of Grading Races.

the

AQHA

(Joseph Bowcutt

Depo., pp. 13-15, 76, R. 1245 et seq.).
8.

The St. George Lions Club is not a corporation.

(Mark

Lukas Depo. at p. 40, R. 1340 et seq.).
9.

The

International

Association

is

a

nonprofit

organization which promotes service activities throughout the
world through individual Lions Clubs.

Each Lions Club, such as

the St. George Club, is entirely autonomous in its operation.
Each club recruits its own members, elects its own officers,
chooses and carries out its own charitable activities, and raises
its own funds.

(Mark Lukas Depo. at pp. 7-10, R. 1340 et seq.;

Ronald McArthur Depo., pp. 51-52, 76-77, R. 1526 et seq.).
10.

In an effort to promote charitable activities, the

International Association provides publications to the

local

clubs which suggest charitable activities that other clubs have
been successful in conducting.

(Mark Lukas Depo. at p. 10, R.

1340 et seq.).
11.

The International Association has no control over which

charitable activities the local clubs choose to conduct, how they
are conducted, or how the local clubs use the funds that they
raise other than to request the funds be used for charitable
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purposes.

(Mark Lukas Depo. at pp. 11 and 24, R. 1340 et seq.;

Ronald McArthur Depo., pp. 60-62, 69, R. 1526 et seq.).
12.

Lions

Clubs

have

no

financial

obligation

to

the

International Association other than each member has an $18.00
annual membership fee.

(Mark Lukas Depo. at p. 11, R. 1340 et

seq.; Ronald McArthur Depo., pp. 52, R. 152 6 et seq.).
13.

There are 41,000 Lions Clubs worldwide that make up the

International Association of Lions Clubs.

(Mark Lukas Depo. at

p. 11, R. 1340 et seq.).
14.

The essence of the International Association's contacts

with the Lions Clubs, such as the St. George Lions Club, is as
follows:
Q.

Why don't you briefly describe for us
what activities International would be
involved in Utah, vis. a vis., the
local clubs?

A.

Well, the International works the same
throughout the world, and that is that
it is an organization of local clubs.
We produce various materials that are
made available to these clubs, once
again to provide them with ideas for
service activities. We provide model
constitutions as to how they might
operate, and we provide supplies that
they can order. [Emphasis added]

(Mark Lukas Depo. at pp. 15-16, R. 1340 et seq.).
15.

The

International

Association's

communication

with

local clubs, such as the St. George Club, is minimal, limited to
sending

out

the

Lions' magazine

to

members

of

the

clubs,

communications on supplies ordered, and materials on suggested
activities.

Each

club

submits
8

a

monthly

membership

and

activities report which is primarily an informational report
about each club.

The report provides data on new members,

dropped members, changes of address, and the amount of time spent
on charitable activities.

These reports are reviewed solely by

data processing operators at the International Association to
obtain statistical information.

If an activity that was highly

unusual appeared on the report, it may be referred to supervisory
personnel. However, as long as the activity that the local club
is involved in is not illegal or blatantly outside of the
charitable mission of the Lions Clubs, then there is little the
International Association can or would do about stopping the
activity.

(Mark Lukas Depo. at pp. 19-21, 77, 79, 144-145, R.

1340 et seq.; Ronald McArthur Depo., pp. 48-49, 60-61, R. 1526
et seq.).
16.

The

International

Association

membership and activity reports every month.

receives

40,000

The report also

goes to a "district governor" who is a locally elected Lions Club
member who uses the report in an effort to encourage the local
clubs in their service activities.

(Mark Lukas Depo. at pp. 20,

74, 75, R. 1340 et seq.).
17.

There are 700 district governors throughout the world,

each serving a minimum of 35 local clubs. A district governor is
a volunteer who receives no compensation other than reimbursement
for travel expenses.

(Mark Lukas Depo. at pp. 20, 139, R. 1340

et seq.).
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18.

It would be a rare occasion for an official from the

International Association to visit a local club such as the St.
George Club.

Typically, an International Association official

will only go to a local club when he is invited to speak to a
group of club members.

(Mark Lukas Depo. at p. 21, R. 1340 et

seq.).
19.

The members of the St. George Lions Club are members of

that club only, and the St. George Club is a member of the
International Association of Lions Clubs. The individual members
of local clubs are not members of the International Association
of Lions Clubs.

(Mark Lukas Depo. at pp. 52-53, R. 1340 et seq.;

Ronald McArthur Depo., pp. 46-47, R. 1526 et seq.).
20.

The International Association had no involvement in the

planning, operation, or funding of any of the races that were
conducted at the Dixie Downs Race Track.

The St. George Lions

Club did not request or need approval from the International
Association to conduct the races.

(Mark Lukas Depo. at pp. 29,

30, 33, 35, R. 1340 et seq.; Ronald McArthur Depo., p. 69, R.
1526 et seq.; Joseph Bowcutt Depo., pp. 78-80, R. 1245 et seq.).
In addition to Ronald McArthur and Joseph Bowcutt, depositions
were taken of Lions Club Members Donald Randall, Gerald Tischner,
Bruce Jacobson, Gai Bowler, Dr. Larry 0. Staples, Jay Ence, and
Kenneth Thompson. All of these club members indicated that there
was no involvement by the International Association in the horse
races at the Dixie Downs Race Track. Depositions were also taken
of jockey Ralph Seville, jockey Joseph Meir, jockey Eddie Garcia,
10

jockey Roman Figureroa, horse trainer Donald Vickery, AQHA
official Butch Jones, AQHA official Joe Langdon, and AQHA
official Joe Wise,

All of these individuals were present and

involved in the April, 1989, races at the Dixie Downs Race Track,
and none of them knew of any involvement that the International
Association had in the conduct of these races.
21.

The International Association received no economic

benefit from the races at the Dixie Downs Race Track.

(Mark

Lukas Depo. at p. 35, R. 1340 et seq.; Joseph Bowcutt Depo., p.
80, R. 1295 et seq.).
22.

AQHA makes only one claim against the International

Association.
gence.

That claim is for indemnity for AQHA's own negli-

AQHA's claim is as follows:
3.

The defendant, St. George Association
of Lions Clubs (hereinafter "St. George
Lions Club"), is a subsidiary of The
International Lions Clubs, and is
located in St. George, Utah.
* * *

6.

At all times relevant herein, St.
George
Lions
Club
installed
and
maintained the track, rails, grounds,
and equipment located at the Dixie
Downs Race Track in St. George, Utah.
St. George Lions Club is a subsidiary
of the International Lions Club.
•k

8.

Jc "k

On or about July 13, 1988, St. George
Lions Club submitted an Application for
Recognition of Grading Races to the
Racing Department of AQHA (hereinafter
"Application") . . . .
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9.

Paragraph
III of
the
Application
contains the following agreement:
"Tentative approval of this application by AQHA does not establish
said Association the insurer or
guarantor
of
the
safety
or
physical condition of Operator's
facilities, stakes of any race, or
reasonableness
of
steward's
rulings; however, Applicant does
hereby agree to indemnity, save
and hold harmless the American
Quarter Horse Association from any
liability arising from unsafe
conditions of track facilities or
grandstand, default in payment or
purses,
or
publication
or
dissemination by Association of
the information concerning any
disciplinary
rulings
of
Applicant's stewards."

10.

Pursuant to Paragraph III of the Application, St. George Lions Club, a
subsidiary
of
International
Lions
Clubs, expressly agreed to indemnify,
save, and hold harmless AQHA for any
and
all
liability
resulting
from
various
circumstances,
including
"unsafe conditions of track facilities"

11.

In the event any liability is assessed
against AQHA as a result of plaintiffs'
claims in this action, AQHA is entitled
to indemnity over and against International Lions Clubs and St. George Lions
Club for said amounts, pursuant to the
above-referenced agreement. [Emphasis
in original]

(AQHA's Answer and Third-Party Complaint, R. 493-505).
The above-numbered facts were stated in the International
Association's memorandum in support of summary judgment in the
trial court and were not disputed by AQHA pursuant to Rule 4501(2), Code of Judicial Administration.
12

The trial judge held a

hearing on June 14, 1993, and found on the record that the
language of the application document is not specific enough to
meet the requirements of Utah law.

(R. 1695).

Summary judgment

was entered dismissing AQHA's claims for indemnity against the
International Association, and this appeal followed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I.

The Application does not contain a clear and

unequivocal agreement to indemnify AQHA for its own negligence as
required by Utah case law.

Even assuming the agreement may be

interpreted to bind the International Association which is not a
party to it, nevertheless, the language of the agreement is not
specific enough to meet the requirements of Utah law, as the
trial court found.
to

state

that

In particular, the agreement fails expressly

any

party

will

indemnify

AQHA

for

AQHA's

negligence.
POINT II.

The St. George Lions Club, which signed the

agreement in question, was not the agent or subsidiary of the
International

Association

and

thus

the

St. George

Club's

contractual obligations are not imputable to the International
Association.

The requisite degree or extent of control is

entirely absent from the relationship between the International
Association and the St. George Lions Club.

No relationship of

agency or subsidiary may be inferred from the material facts.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE INDEMNITY LANGUAGE IN THE AGREEMENT IS NOT VALID
UNDER UTAH LAW TO CREATE A DUTY TO INDEMNIFY FOR THE
NEGLIGENCE OF THE PROMISEE.
AQHA's claim is that the indemnity agreement requires the
International Association to indemnify AQHA for " . . . any and
all liability . . . " arising from horse racing at Dixie Downs
race track.
seq.).

(AQHA's Third-Party Complaint at para. 8, R. 493 et

Of course, under Utah law, AQHA is responsible to

plaintiffs only for its own proportion of fault. AQHA does not
have a right of "contribution" from any other entity. Utah Code
Ann.

§ 78-27-40.

AQHA's

claim

is

that

the

International

Association must indemnify it for its own negligence.
Utah law does not favor agreements wherein one party is to
indemnify another party for the other party's own negligence.
Howe Rents Corp. v. Worthen, 420 P.2d 848, 849 (Utah 1966); Union
Pacific R.R. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 408 P.2d 910, 913-914
(Utah 1965).

Such indemnity contracts are strictly construed

against the party seeking indemnity.

Union Pacific R.R. v.

International Farmers Ass'n, 568 P.2d 724, 725 (Utah

1911);

Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. First Security Corp. , 341 P.2d 944,
947 (Utah 1959).
In Utah, for an indemnity agreement to be valid, there must
be proof that the indemnitor clearly and unequivocally agreed to
indemnify the indemnitee for his own negligence. Freund v. Utah
Power and Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 370 (Utah 1990).
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In Freund, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
A party is contractually obligated to assume
ultimate financial responsibility for the
negligence of another only when the
intention is "clearly and unequivocally
expressed."
Shell Oil Co. , 658 P. 2d at
1189; El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 17 Utah 2d at
259, 408 P.2d at 914.
Id. at 370.
In order to require one party to indemnify another party for
the negligence of such other party resulting in injury or death,
Utah law requires that all of the following conditions be met:
1.

A clear and unequivocal express agreement by the
contracting party.

2.

To

indemnify

the

promisee

for

the

promisee's

negligence.
3.

In causing injury to the victim.

4.

In the work identified in the agreement.

Freund, 793 P.2d at 370-372.
In the

instant

case, the

first

three

of

these

four

requirements are not met.
To be "clear," "unequivocal" and "express," the indemnity
language must say that the indemnitor will indemnify the indemnitee for his own negligence.

Wollam v. Kennecott Corp., 663

F.Supp. 268, 272 (D. Utah 1987). The Wollam opinion specifically
stated:
Here, paragraph 8 of the insulation contract
suffers from the same lack of specificity
found deficient in El Paso. The general
language that Stockmar releases Kennecott
from claims based upon "any and all . . .
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injuries or death, occasioned by anything
occurring in or about the execution and
performance of this purchase order . . . "
fails expressly to state that Stockmar will
indemnify
Kennecott
for
Kennecott' s
negligence, [Emphasis added]
Id. at 272.
Under

Wollam,

the

traditional

strict

construction

rule

requires the indemnity agreement to specifically state that the
indemnitor

agrees

to

indemnify

the

indemnitee

for

his

own

negligence.
The case of Gordon v. CRS Consulting Engineers Inc., 820
P. 2d

492

(Utah

App.

1991),

reiterated

that

the

strict

construction rule was followed when it stated:
The Utah courts apply the rule of strict
construction
when
confronted
with
an
indemnity agreement . . . Under this rule,
there is a presumption against an intent to
indemnify unless the intention is clearly
and unequivocally expressed.
[Emphasis
added]
Id. at 494.

See also, Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp., 858 P.2d

995, 998 (Utah 1993) .
The indemnity provision of the Application for Recognition
of Grading Races is too vague to be valid even again the St.
George Lions Club because it does not delineate that the St.
George Lions Club agrees to be responsible for AQHA's negligence.
AQHA complains on appeal that the trial court failed to
provide a statement of the grounds for its summary
decision under Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P.

judgment

However, the trial court

stated its grounds on the record with sufficient clarity.

16

(R.

1695-96).

Rule 52(a) provides that it will be sufficient if the

Court's findings are stated orally and recorded in open court.
In any event, AQHA overlooks the rule that the appeals court may
affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the
trial court, even if it is one not relied on by the trial court.
For example, in Higgins v. Salt Lake Co., 855 P.2d 231, 233, 240241 (Utah 1993), the trial judge granted summary judgment to
defendants on the ground that they owed no duty of care; the Utah
Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in basing its
summary judgment on lack of duty, but went on to address a
question not reached by the trial court, whether there was
immunity under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, and affirmed
the judgment of the trial court on that alternative ground.
Likewise, in State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Gearyf 231 U.A.R. 12
(Utah App. 1994), summary judgment was affirmed.

See also Hill

v. Seattle First National Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1992);
Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assoc, 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
AQHA cites Dover Elevator Co. v. Hill Mangum Investments,
766 P.2d 424 (Utah App. 1988), for the rule that failure by the
trial court to state the grounds for its decision may be
reversible error.

Actually, that case states exactly the

opposite with respect to summary judgments:

"Findings and

conclusions are ordinarily not required where a case is resolved
on motion."

766 P. 2d at 426 n. 4. Further, the court's opinion

in the Dover Elevator case was rendered on the facts and not
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because of any procedural noncompliance with Rule 52(a).

AQHA

cites Masters v. Worsleyr 777 P.2d 499, 501 (Utah App. 1989),
also for the rule that failure to comply with Rule 52(a) may
justify remand to the trial court.

However, in that case also,

the Court of Appeals did not decide the appeal on the basis of
any failure to state the grounds for the order.

The Court of

Appeals considered the theories propounded by respondent Worsley
and found they insufficient and reversed on that ground.
POINT II.
THE UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS DO NOT SHOW ANY LEGAL
GROUND FOR HOLDING THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR THE ST. GEORGE LIONS CLUB'S
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS.
AQHA makes no claim against the International Association of
actual wrongdoing that caused the AQHA damages.

Instead, AQHA

claims that the International Association is vicariously or
derivatively liable for any contractual duty that the St. George
Lions Club owes AQHA as a result of the indemnity agreement.
Therefore, if the International Association is not contractually
bound to the indemnity agreement, or if the indemnity agreement
is invalid against the International Association, then as a
matter of law, AQHA has no claim against the International
Association.
The July 13, 1988, Application for Recognition of Grading
Races, in which the indemnity agreement is contained, was signed
by Joe Bowcutt as the "track manager."

Above his signature,

Bowcutt wrote "The St. George Lions Club."
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In his deposition,

Mr. Bowcutt acknowledged that he signed the Application for
Recognition
Association's

of

Grading

knowledge

Races.

As

to

the

International

about the application, Mr. Bowcutt

testified:
Q.

Did you ever have any communication
with The International concerning this
application?

A.

No, sir.

Q.

To your knowledge did any St. George
Lion have any communication with The
International concerning this application?

A.

Not to my knowledge.

Q.

Did you ever receive any communication
from The International with respect to
this application?

A.

I did not.

Q.

In any of your dealings with the AQHA
in connection with this application,
did you ever make any statement or
communication to AQHA that you were
acting on behalf of The International?

A.

No, sir.
•k

k

-k

Q.

Well, let me ask it this way: When you
signed it, [the AQHA application] was
it your intention that you were signing
it on behalf of the St. George Lions
Club?

A.

That's the way I signed it.
•k

Q.

"k

k

Was it your intention to sign it on
behalf of The International Association
of Lions Clubs?
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A.

No.

(Joe Bowcutt Depo. at pp. 76, 77, 86, 87, R. 1245 et seq.).
The

executive

administrator

of

the

International

Association, Mark C. Lukas, made clear in his deposition that the
International Association did not agree to be bound to the terms
of the AQHA application.

The International Association did not

receive, review, or know of the application's existence prior to
its execution, and did not subsequently find out about the
application until the lawsuit was filed.

The International

Association did not give the St. George Lions Club authority to
represent it or bind it to the terms of the AQHA application.
(Mark Lukas Depo. at pp. 38-40, R. 1340 et seq.).
There is no reference to the International Association in
the AQHA application.
Clearly, the International Association cannot be bound to
the indemnity provision of the application when it had no
knowledge of it.
St.

George

"subsidiary."
who

were

The AQHA claims the liability arises from the

Club

being

the

International

Association's

Mark Lukas, and the St. George Lions Club members

deposed,

stated

relationship existed.

that

no

"subsidiary"

or

"agent"

However, even if it is assumed that the

St. George Lions Club was a "subsidiary" of the International
Association, a "subsidiary" cannot bind a "parent" to a contract
without authority to do so. A "subsidiary" is equivalent to an
"agent."

The Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 7 states:

20

Authority is the power of the agent to
effect the legal relations of the principal
by acts done in accordance with the
principal's manifestations of consent to
him. [Emphasis added]
Comment (a) to the above Restatement states in relevant part:
"Authority" as used in the Restatement of
this Subject, is the power of the agent to
do an act or to conduct a transaction on
account of the principal which, with respect
to the principal, he is privileged to do
because of the principal's manifestations to
him. There is no authority unless there is
power to effect the legal relations of the
principal. . . . the privilege must come
from the manifestations of consent of the
principal that the agent should act upon
account of the principal. [Emphasis added]
The Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 26 reads in relevant
part:
. . . authority to do an act can be created
by written or spoken words or other conduct
of the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes the agent to believe that the
principal desires him to act on the
principal's account. [Emphasis added]
The case of Municipal Building Authority of Iron County v.
Lowder, 711 P.2d 273 (Utah 1985), confirms that in Utah, a party
cannot be bound by another to an agreement without a showing of
consent to be bound. In this case, Iron County officials claimed
the Iron County Board of Commissioners had created the Iron
County Building Authority for the sole purpose of incurring debt
to finance the new jail facility without having to go directly to
the public for approval.

Such an action was claimed to be

unconstitutional because any debts incurred by the building
authority were also the county's debts if the building authority
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was an agent of the county.

In affirming the trial court's

rejection of this argument, the Utah Supreme Court pointed out
that the building authority was not an agent because it did not
have authority to bind the county to the debts. The court said:
An agent cannot make its principal responsible for the agent's debts unless the agent
is acting pursuant to either actual or
apparent
authority.
See Restatement
(Second) Agency, §§ 26 and 27 (1958). The
latter is implied where the principal has
permitted the agent to mislead third parties
to extending credit to the agent in reliance
on the principal's credit or has otherwise
ratified the agent's action. Id. at § 27.
We find neither condition for an agency
relationship to be present in this case.
There is no suggestion that the Authority is
actually authorized to bind the county on
the bonds f nor is there any basis for
finding that third parties will be mislead
as to the county's liability on the bonds.
[Emphasis added]
Id. at 279.
Just as Iron County was found not be bound by the actions of
the building authority, the International Association is not
bound by the indemnity agreement that the St. George Lions Club
entered into with AQHA.

There is no evidence in this case that

the International Association knew about the indemnity agreement,
gave the St. George Lions Club authority to bind it to the
agreement, or that the St. George Lions Club in any way led AQHA
to believe that it had authority to bind the International
Association to the indemnity agreement.
The International Association is not vicariously liable for
the St. George Lions Club's contractual obligations.
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Under any

theory of vicarious liability, the key issue is whether the
International Association controlled the activities of the St.
George Lions Club.

The discovery record showed that the St.

George Lions Club was an autonomous organization which was not
under the control of the International Association.
Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 1 defines the theory of
agency as follows:
(1) Agency is the fiduciary relationship
which results from the manifestation of
consent by one person to another that
the other shall act on his behalf and
subject to his control. . . .
(2) The one for whom action is to be taken
is the principal.
(3) The one who is to act is the agent.
[Emphasis added]
There is no evidence that in this case the International
Association asked the St. George Lions Club to act on its behalf
and subject to its control.

(Mark Lukas Depo. at p. 27, R. 1340

et seq.).
In Utah, the issue of "control" in an agency relationship
was discussed in the case of Foster v. Steed, 432 P.2d 60 (Utah
1967).

In that case, a customer sued the operator of a service

station and the oil company, Texaco, for burns received while
helping the operator of the service station.

The plaintiff

contended that an agency relationship existed between Texaco and
the local service station operator making Texaco liable for the
acts of its agent. The trial court denied a motion by Texaco for
summary judgment and Texaco brought an interlocutory appeal. The
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Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision.

The

Supreme Court found that the local service station was not an
agent of Texaco despite the fact that:

(1) Texaco owned the

service station facility; (2) Texaco insured that the service
station was

properly

maintained;

(3) Texaco

inspected

the

facility; (4) the uniforms, gas pumps, documents, and the sign
out

front,

all

bore

the

Texaco

logo;

(5) the

station

traditionally only sold Texaco products; and (6) the manner of
delivery of the products was controlled by Texaco. Instead, the
court focused on the fact that:
The operators were obligated to pay for
their gas and accessories on a cash basis
and could sell them at a price of their own
determination. They could buy products from
sources other than Texaco, and stood to
retain all the profits and suffer all the
losses incurred in the operation of the
station. They could sell the products on a
credit basis if they so desired.
As
previously mentioned, the operators could
hire and fire their employees, set their
hours of operation, and were not required to
make reports to Texaco. . . . None of the
evidence cited by plaintiff indicates that
Texaco retained control of the day-to-day
operation but, rather, merely influenced the
result to be achieved, revealing an independent contractor status. [Emphasis added]
Id. at 63.
Cases outside Utah use the same rationale as Foster in
finding

that

national

charitable

organizations

are

not

vicariously liable for the actions of their local units when the
national organization did not control the day-to-day operations
of the local organization.
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In Himes v. Particular Council of Pima County, et a h , 728
P. 2d 693 (Ariz. App. 1986), the plaintiff sued the Diocese of
Tucson, and its affiliated charitable organizations, for having
been molested by a volunteer of the charitable organizations
while the volunteer was delivering food to the plaintiff.

The

volunteer was working directly for St. Vincent DePaul Society
(SVDP) Conference.

SVDP was organized by the Particular Council

of Pima County (PCPC) who apparently answered directly to the
Diocese of Tucson.

PCPC was granted summary judgment because

there was no issue of material fact that the volunteer was an
agent of PCPC.

The trial court's ruling was affirmed by the

Arizona Court of Appeals.

In its opinion, the Appellate Court

quoted from the PCPC manual which stated:
"Each parish conference is autonomous.
Generally speaking each can operate in its
own way, at its own pace, providing it works
within the framework and 'Rule' of the
international organization .... The 'Rule'
provides for supervision of conferences to
insure that this freedom is not abused and
that they firmly adhere to the established
framework of the Society."
The orientation manual goes on to state:
"The purpose of this council is to give
unity
and
strength,
coordination
and
supervision, direction and assistance to its
several conferences and to serve as liaison
between the conferences and higher levels of
the society"
Id. at 694.
In analyzing the effect of PCPC's rules in relationship to
its underlying charitable organizations, the court stated:
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Focusing on the word 'supervision' in the
passages above, the appellant claims that
PCPC had the right to control Orozco's [the
volunteer's] activities and that, therefore,
he was its agent for whose activities it was
liable.
We do not believe the word
'supervision' as used can be read as giving
PCPC control over the activities of
volunteer workers of SVDP conferences. In
context, the supervision is limited to
assuring that the conferences perform the
charitable works that are the purpose of the
Society.
Who shall be members, what
charitable works shall be undertaken, who
shall be beneficiaries of those works, and
the means by which these purposes shall be
achieved are all committed to the local
conference. There is no accountability by
the conference to the council for its 'dayto-day ' operation. . . . There was for the
council 'no right to control the transaction
in guestion' . . . The supervision that the
council was authorized to provide was
'spiritual
supervision'; there
is no
evidence of any activity to control the
operations of the conferences.... The
control available to the council was control
over the general ends to be pursued, not the
means to achieve them. Such control does
not make an owner liable for the acts of an
independent contractor. . . . Neither does
it make PCPC liable for the torts of a
volunteer worker. . . . [Emphasis added]
Id. at 694-695.
In Davis v. Shelton, 304 N.Y.2d 722, appeal dism'd. 26
N.Y.2d 829, 309 N.Y.2d, 358, 257 N.E.2d 902 (N.Y. 1969), a
fourteen-year-old boy scout was seriously injured when the limb
of the tree he was climbing broke under his weight and he fell to
the ground. The boy was a member of Boy Scout Troop 39 which was
at the time on an all-night camping trip. The trip was sponsored
by the St. Andrew's Church and was also under a "charter" granted
by the National Council of Boy Scouts of America, Inc. Prior to
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being chartered by the Boy Scouts of America, the troop had to be
pre-approved by the Susquenango Council of Boy Scouts of America.
The plaintiff sued the Susquenango Council, St. Andrew's Church,
the Scoutmaster, Assistant Scoutmaster, and the property owners
on whose land the all-night camping trip was held.

The New York

Supreme Court granted summary judgment as to all the defendants
except

the

Scoutmaster

plaintiff appealed.
appeal.

and

Assistant

Scoutmaster

and

the

The trial court's ruling was affirmed on

The New York Appellate Court pointed out that the

plaintiff alleged that both the church and the Boy Scout Council
were negligent in providing incompetent and inexperienced leaders
for the troop.

In rejecting this argument, the court stated:

Respondents' motions for summary judgment
were properly granted since there was no
triable
issue
of
fact
as
to
their
negligence. There was no relationship which
would make the Council and St. Andrew's
Church liable for the acts of the defendants
Shelton and Guinane.
The Council is
primarily a conduit which forwards troop
charter
applications
to
the
National
Council.
It exercises no supervision or
control over the activities of a scout troop
which would be a primary element in
establishing a master-servant relationship
upon which to build a theory of respondeat
superior. [Emphasis added]
Id. at pp. 723-724.
As was the case in Foster, Himes., and Davis., in this case
there

is

no

evidence

that

the

International

Association

controlled the day-to-day operations of the St. George Lions
Club, and thus the International Association cannot be liable for
the indemnity agreement that the Club entered into with AQHA.
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As to the St. George Club's finances, the St. George Club's
secretary/treasurer, Ronald McArthur stated:
Q.

Did The International give any directions, instruction or control about how
the St. George Club spent any money
aside from the requirement of dues?

A.

No, sir.
•k

ic "k

Q.

Who is authorized to sign on that
account [the St. George Club's bank
account]?

A.

Three signatures.
Four signatures.
It's on the card.
Mine has to be
signed; three others are countersigned
depending on the issuance of the check.
We have —

Q.

Who are those three others?

A.

Chairman
of the Race Committee,
Chairman of the Rodeo Committee, and
the President of the Lions Club is on
the card.

Q.

St. George Club?

A.

St. George.

Q.

All these people are members of the St.
George Club?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Is any person from The International on
the bank account —

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Or empowered to handle the finances?

A.

No, sir.

(Ronald McArthur Depo. at pp. 74 and 76, R. 1526 et seq.).
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The St. George Lions Club determined what activities it
would be involved in, funded those activities, and managed the
activities. On this point, the vice president of the St. George
Lions Club stated:
Q.

Has The International financed the
Dixie Downs Project or the other races
or any other activity of the St. George
Club?

A.

No, sir.
*

* "k

Q.

Have you ever had any directions from
The International about what activities
you should spend your time on?

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Has The International ever told the St.
George Club, to your knowledge, that it
should or should not participate in the
Dixie Downs Project?

A.

No, sir. . . .

Q.

To
your
knowledge,
does
The
International suggest or require a
particular level of volunteer activity
in terms of hours spent per month?

A.

No, sir.
Depending on — sometimes
they have — they have a district
contest and give so many points for man
hours. That's the only reason itfs put
in.

Q.

Have you ever had any criticism from
The International about the conduct of
any of your activities?

A*

No, sir.

Q.

Have you ever received any guidelines
from The International about what
activities you should or should not
participate in?
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A.

No, sir.

(Ronald McArthur Depo. at pp. 60-62 and 76, R. 1526 et seq.).
The International Association played no part in organizing,
promoting, or conducting any of the horse races at Dixie Downs
Race Track, specifically the race in question on April 21, 1989.
On this issue, the Dixie Downs Track manager for the St. George
Lions Club, Joseph Bowcutt, stated:
Q.

To your knowledge, has anyone at the
St. George Club, including yourself,
ever received any communications from
The
International
concerning
the
standards for maintaining the track?

A.

Not to my knowledge.

Q.

Concerning the operation of races?

A.

Not to my knowledge.

Q.

Concerning the construction of track or
the rails?

A.

Not to my knowledge.

Q.

Concerning the location of
close to the inside railing?

A.

Not to my knowledge.

Q.

Concerning the requirements for jockey
equipment?

A.

Not to my knowledge. . . .

Q.

Yes, do you have any knowledge of facts
that the St. George Club ever went to
The International for prior approval
for their races?

A.

To my knowledge, no, they did not.

Q.

To your knowledge, did the St. George
Lions Club ever give prior notice to
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objects

The International that it was going to
conduct these particular races?
A.

Not to my knowledge.

Q.

To
your
knowledge,
did
The
International ever inspect the race
track or the conduct of the races by
the St. George Club?

A.

Not to my knowledge.

Q.

To
your
knowledge,
did
The
International ever benefit financially
by —
from the profits or revenues
directly received by the St. George
Club from the operation of the races?

A.

Not to my knowledge.

(Joseph Bowcutt Depo. at pp. 78-80, R. 1245 et seq.).
The St. George Lions Club had total autonomy as to who the
members and officers of the club would be.

(Mark Lukas Depo.,

pp. 7-10, R. 1340 et seq.; Ronald McArthur Depo., pp. 76-77, R.
1526 et seq.; Joseph Bowcutt Depo., p. 79, R. 1245 et seq.).
The St. George Lions Club did provide a monthly report to
the International Association.

However, both the International

Association and the officers of the St. George Lions Club have
made clear that these monthly reports were used for statistical
purposes and not as a means of controlling the activities of the
St. George Lions Club.

(Mark Lukas Depo., pp. 20, 21, 77, 79,

144-145, R. 1340 et seq.; Ronald McArthur Depo., pp. 60-61, R.
1526 et seq.).
The International Association had no more control over the
St. George Lions Club than Texaco, The Particular Council of Pima
County, or The Susquenango Counsel of Boy Scouts of America had
31

over their local units.

The International Association did not

finance the club's activities; had no control over how club funds
were spent, did not determine or conduct club activities; did not
choose or approve club officers or members; gave no prior
approval to the club on any matter; had no ownership interest in
any club facilities or assets; made no inspections, and; had no
participation in the horse races at Dixie Down race track.
Essentially, the International Association had nothing to do with
the day-to-day operations of the St. George Club.

At best, the

International Association's relationship with the St. George Club
was like that of the Particular Council of Pima County in Himes;
it gave direction and assistance to the St. George Club, as it
did with

the 41,000 other

clubs, to help

it perform

the

charitable works that are the purpose of the local Lions Clubs.
The relationship was intended to influence these charitable ends.
The International Association in no way controlled the actions of
the St. George Club in a way that would make the St. George Club
its agent.
The St. George Lions Club is not a "subsidiary" of the
International Association.

As mentioned, AQHA's third party

complaint specifically refers to the St. George Lions Club as a
"subsidiary" of the International Association.

(R. 493-505).

There is no evidence that the St. George Lions Club is a
"subsidiary" of the International Association. A "subsidiary" is
defined

as

"...a

company

wholly

controlled

by

another."

(Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, at page 1176 [1986]).
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The St* George Lions Club is clearly not a "company" controlled
by the International Association.

The St. George Lions Club is

not a corporation, and the International Association has no
ownership interest in any assets of the St. George Lions Club.
(Mark Lukas Depo. at p. 40, R. 1340 et seq.; Ronald McArthur
Depo. at p. 70, R. 1526 et seq.).

Even if being a corporate

entity is not a requirement to being a "subsidiary", there is
clearly

insufficient

control

between

the

International

Association and the St. George Lions Club for a "subsidiary"
relationship

to exist.

The degree of

control necessary

is

pointed out in Japan Petroleum Company v. Ashland Oil, Inc., et
al. , 456 F.Supp. 831 (U.S. D. Ct. Del. 1978) when the United
States Court for the District of Delaware quoted Consolidated
Rock Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941) and stated:
It is well settled that where a holding
company
directly
intervenes
in
the
management of its subsidiaries so as to
treat them as mere departments of its own
enterprise, it is responsible for the
obligations of these subsidiaries incurred
or arising during its management.
Id. at 838.
The court went on to define the degree of control necessary
when it stated:
In order to determine whether or not a
sufficient degree of control exists to
establish an agency relationship, the court
must look to a wide variety of factors, such
as stock ownership, officers and directors,
financing, responsibility for day-to-day
operations, arrangements for payment of
salaries and expenses, and origin of the
subsidiary's business and assets . . . all
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of these factors may be considered in
determining whether the combination of
circumstances indicates such a relationship.
Id. at 841.
It was further pointed out in Japan Petroleum that the
central issue in determining a subsidiary relationship is the
element

of

control,

i.e.

whether

the

parent

corporation

"dominated" the activities of the entity claimed to be the
subsidiary.

Id. at 840-841.

There is no evidence in this case that the International
Association "dominated" the activities of the St. George Lions
Club.

Taking

Petroleumf

the

the

elements

International

of

control

Association

itemized
had

no

in

Japan

ownership

interest in the St. George Club, did not determine or direct the
officers or membership of the club, had no responsibility for the
day-to-day operations of the club, gave no money to the club to
fund salaries or activities, and had no participation in the
determination or operation of fund raising activities.

As a

result, the St. George Lions Club cannot be classified as
"subsidiary"

of

the

International

Association,

and

the

International Association is not liable for the local club's
actions.
The International Association cannot be vicariously liable
for the St. George Lions Club's Actions Simply Because the St.
George Club is a member of the International Association of Lions
Clubs.

AQHA argued to the trial court that a member of the St.

George

Lions

Club

is

also

a member
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of

the

International

Association of Lions Clubs and thus the International Association
is vicariously liable for the St. George Lions Club members'
agreement to indemnify the AQHA.

Mark Lukas clarified in his

deposition that the members of the St, George Club are members of
that club only, and it is the St. George Club itself that is a
member of the International Association of Lions Clubs.

(Mark

Lukas Depo. at pp. 52-53, R. 1340 et seq. ) . In fact, the members
of the St. George Lions Club each have a membership card that
certifies that the individual is a member of the St. George Lions
Club. The membership card does not indicate that the individual
is a member of the International Association of Lions Clubs. The
backside of the membership card indicates that the card serves as
"Proof of your being a Lion in good standing in your Club."
Even if St. George Lions Club members were also members of
the International Association, that fact alone would not make the
International Association liable for the actions of the club
members.

As shown in the above-mentioned

cases, Himes v.

Particular Council of Pima County, 728 P.2d 693, and Davis v.
Shelton, 304 N.Y.2d 722, a charitable organization is not liable
for the actions of one of

its

local volunteers

unless a

significant degree of control can be shown by the international
organization over the local charitable unit out of which the
volunteer worked. As discussed, no such control existed in this
case.

With 41,000 clubs, it is obvious that the International

Association could not, and did not, control the local clubs, such
as St. George, to the extent necessary to be vicariously liable
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for the St. George Club's actions.
member

negotiated

and

Thus, if a St. George Club

signed an agreement with AQHA, that

agreement has no bearing on the International Association.
CONCLUSION
The terms of the application for recognition of grading
races are not adeguate to create a duty to indemnity AQHA as the
promisee for its own negligence. Such agreements are not favored
in Utah law and are strictly construed against the party seeking
indemnity.

The language of the application in this case falls

far short of the reguired specificity.

Even if the indemnity

language were sufficient, it would extend only to the St. George
Lions Club, as the promissor in the agreement. The International
Association was not a party to the agreement.

The relationship

between the International Association and the St. George Lions
Club was not one which would render the International Association
liable as a matter of law for agreements made by the St. George
Lions Club.
This Court should affirm the summary judgment.
DATED this

/J

day of May, 1994.
STRONG & HANNI

BYRoger
Jffr
Peter H. Christensen
Attorneys for International
Association of Lions Clubs
205661nh
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EXHIBIT A

AMERICAN QUARTER HORSE ASSOCL
RACING DEPARTMENT

"N

APPLICATION FOR RECOGNITION OF GRADING RACES
I.

Track Operator

ST. GEORGE L I O N S CLUB
(Name of Person!s) or

organization; if organization,, name of "autfior i z ed representative) herein after referred
to as "Applicant", hereby app lies for recognition by American Quarter Horse Association
of the grading races at
DIXIE DOWNS
I Name of Irack)
Which is located at

P.O. BOX 214
(Mai ling Address)
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770
(City, State and Zip Code)

Recognition is requested for cjrading races to be held on the following dates:
APRIL 21 & 22, 1989
APRIL 28 & 29, 1989

II.
Applicant agrees to comply fully v/ith the terms and conditions of this application
and the American Quarter Horse Association Regulations for Approved Grading Meets, 20th
edition, or any future edition or amendment thereof (which publication is incorporated
therein by reference and made a part hereof for all purposes) and Applicant's failure to
so comply will be cause for refusal of recognition of any and all races, and will
jeopardize any further approval of races conducted by Applicant. When the Association
finds that all races have been conducted according to this agreement, and all other
regulations of the Association, then, and only in such event, will such races be
recognized and charted.
III.
Tentative approval of this application by AQUA does not establish said Association
the insurer or guarantor of the safety or physical condition of Operator's facilities,
stakes of any race, or reasonableness of stewards' rulings; however, Applicant does
hereby agree to indemnity, save and hold harmless the American Quarter Horse Association
from any liability arising from unsafe conditions of track facilities or grandstand,
default in payment of stakes or purses, or publication or dissemination by Association of
information concerning any disciplinary rulings of Applicant's stewards.
This application is signed in duplicate on this the

A3th

day of

jn\

Signature Operator and/or (Jw:eFJ
P.O. Box 214
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